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J.B. MeMINN projection as conveyances of immediate truth 6 • What this cornes to, 1 c1aim, is that these myths are covertly in the service of the maieutic art, playing the special role of furnishing fodder for the extrapolation of fact from fiction. This conjectural process is a unique mytho-logical inference of Plato's invention, which 1 have here christened the «mantic» function of myth.
Taken generaHy, ' t€XVll IllXV'ttKYt is the art or faculty of divination, the occult technique of foreseeing future events or divining sorne unknown lore, beyond the bounds of reason, by invoking supernatural powers 7 . Plato's myths, in this sense, fulfiH this basic function, providing fictive accounts of eschatological beliefs. But they also become a curious means of divining from these beliefs philosophical truths of moral import, albeit within the bounds of reason, by adducing plausible probabilities that, while not so convincing as proofs, are beyond reasonable doubt and admittedly persuasive 8 . These probabilities, taking on the role of «truths» and «first principles»9, form the background theory to the theory in question and thus furnish the necessary condition that determines the logical limits of the «proofs» formulated in the epagogic 10 procedure of the Socratic method.
Focusing, then, on the significance of Plato's mytho-logical strategy and keying on the Timaeus as an explanatory model, 1 shaH, in my argument, decode the mantic myth in three ways, with special reference to its occurrence in the Gorgias as a paradigm case 11 : (1) how myth in its pragmatic role, as distinguished from its dramatic motive, unveils its mantic function; (2) by adducing from the fictive details of the myth plausible probabilities as adumbrations of true belief and remarking the psychological basis of their sanction; and, finally, (3) by deriving «first principles» from the probabilities and showing how they together form the background theory that defines the logical limits of the argument in situ.
Cracking the Fabric ofMyth
The dramatic motive. As holistic art forms, Plato's myths play their part in the dialogues in dramatic instances which afford the interlocutors, as weIl as the reader, a refreshing filler from lengthy discourse, a fascinating tale of occult power (maybe, with tongue-incheek), or simply a playful diversion; and Plato usually has Socrates or sorne dramatis persona remark that particular motive. For example, in the Phaedo, foUowing the final argument on the immortality of the soul and after relating his lengthy myth on the earth and afterlife, Socrates refers to it as a «magic charm» (rocrm,p E1tÇ:OEtV) that should inspire aU with confidence and good cheer 12 . Similarly, in the Laws, the Athenian Stranger, although admitting the force of compelling arguments, stiU recognizes the need of myths to charm the soul (E1tCfloroV ... JluSrov Ë'tt 'ttvrov)13. Again in the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger, after stumbling in the dialectic and failing to define precisely the royal or kingly art, suggests taking a new starting-point by a different route, but first offers a «worthy tale» (JlEYuÀou JluSou) to mitigate the strain of protracted argument 14 . In other places, Socrates also refers to myth in its dramatic force as poe tic embellishment, suggesting the role of play and amusement and dubbing the myths with such descriptive labels as «pleasant stories» (1tpàç 'tà lloÉroç JlUSoÀoyi'1crat)15, «prudent tales» (JluSOtcrt craô<ppocrtV )16, «fairest tales» (KuÀÀtcr'ta JlEJlUSoÀo'Y1lJléva) 17 , and «auspicious accounts» (KaÀoû ÀÔyou) 18. So much, then, for the internaI evidence showing that these fictions serve as poetic interludes to fit the dramatic intent and structure of the dialogue 19 .
A pragmatic rale. Further evidence shows, however, that some myths also have a pragmatic role, one in keeping with the intent and structure of the dialectic. They are not just pleasant stories but are also useful (XP1lcrqlOV) mantic devices bearing philosophieal import 20 . In his telling brief on a mythic passage in the Statesman, Paul Shorey insinuates this practical agency with his forthright statement that «deep truths are hidden in many ancient fables»21. This underlying alethic motif becomes the pragmatic angle of the mantic myth, that special value feature in which the utility of the myth consists. In the Republic, for example, there among the serviceable functions of false accounts ('to èv 'toîç À6YOtç \jIEûùoç)22 Socrates alleges that storytelling (lluSoÀoytu) is a useful means of mythotropic conversion of fiction into fact (àÀ'llS1Îç-'what is true')23 :
Because of our ignorance of truth about the ancient past, we [now] portray, as best we can, the fictitious as fact (true) and so make it useful (à<p0llowûv'tEç àÀllSeî 'to \jIEÛÙOÇ o'tt Il<xÀto"'tu 01h00 XP1Î(HIlOV TCoWûllEV )24.
And, in the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger, using almost the same construction, points out the pragmatic function of myth as a diagnostic stratagem, the technique of discovering deviation from truth :
Thus, the end of the tale, so be it; but we shall make it useful (XP'ÎlcrtjlOV oÈ aù'tov rcOtlWOIl€Sa) in recognizing how far we went wrong in our exposition of the royal and political art in the previous discussion 25 .
But, perhaps, the most telling case occurs in the Timaeus, where, in the preface to his cosmic account, Timaeus claims that myth is also useful in providing belief so plausible, as to be an analogue to truth, that it is fitting for one to accept it (the «likely story») as true :
The copy (belief) statements ('toùç À.6youç) Cafter the likeness of the model [true statementsJ) will be probable and analogous to the true statements : as being is to becoming, so truth to belief('toùç oÈ 'tOû rcpoç IlÈV E1OEîvo àrcwcacrSfv'toÇ oÈ €iK:ovoç ÈtlCô'taç àvà À.6yov 'tE ElCEtVffiV ov'taç' o'tt1t€P rcpoç YfV€crtV oùcrta, 'tou'to rcpoç rctcr'tLV àÀ'ÎlS€ta) ... let us be content [then] ... on the condition that it is fitting for us to accept the likely story Crocr't€ rc€pt 'tOU'tffiV 'tov €llCÔta llûSov àrcoo€XOllfVOUÇ rcPfrc€t 'tou'tou)26.
The salient point of this analogical inference 27 is the alleged progressive convergence of kindred values Calethic and pistic) in two otherwise different cognitive conditions (epistemic and doxastic, respectively) to a degree where belief becomes by conviction true opinion and, finally, true opinion confirmed becomes knowledge.
Admittedly, these tactics seem strange and obscure, and it is rather unlikely that one should accept fiction C",€ûooç) as fact CàÀ'ÎlS€ta) on the basis of analogical inference, diagnostic stratagem, or mythotropic conversion. But however odd or difficult it may be, this is the first maneuver of Plato's mythological strategy, a mode of indirection which leads to a more acceptable logical refinement in the adduction of plausible propositions, from the fictive accounts, that will serve to underpin the arguments at issue in the epagogic procedure of Socratic midwifery.
Divining Fact from Fiction
An interpretive key. Thus having, in a sense, cracked the fabric of the mantic myth by showing Plato's claim of its usefulness as an indirect truth-bearing fiction, we turn, again, to the Timaeus for a clue as to how fact may be divined from fiction, or, more precisely, how true opinion (8oç,a àÀ1l8~ç;) may be derived from unreflected belief(rctcrttç;). After a distillation of his basic metaphysical assumptions forming the background theory and logical limits of his cosmic myth, Timaeus cautions his auditors on the indirection of the «likely story», especially, on the imprecision of its language and consequent claim to truth, with this caveat and prospect :
80crates, if we are unable to make statements (Myouç;) concerning so many things about the gods and the genesis of the universe that are in every way completely consistent (Oj.loÀoyoUj.LÉvouç;) and conclusive (àrcllKptpffij.l€vouç;), do not be surprised; but if we adduce probabilities second to none (j.lllOEVoÇ;~'t'tov rcapExffij.lE8a dKo'taç;), let us be content, remembering that we ... are only human; and so it is fitting for us to accept the likely story concerning these things (rcEpt 'tOU'tffiV 'tov Eixo'ta j.lû80v àrcOOEX0j.l€VOuç;), but beyond this to inquire no further 28 .
This cautionary word implies two probing inferences which earmark the mantic function of myth and warrant an interpretive extrapolation as its rationale : (1) that among the fictive details of the mythical account, there are probable statements or implications whose positive truth-value, while not confirmed, approaches certainty and (2) that these plausible probabilities, being beyond reasonable doubt, are acceptable as true opinion and, thus, worthy of belief.
A paradigm case. At the end of the last «act» of the argument-line in the Gorgias, 80crates, having carried out, with Callicles (the immoralist rhetorician), his inductive search on the moral question «whether doing wrong is a greater evil than suffering it», proposes to tell an old story he claims to be true to support his thesis that doing wrong is the greater evil. l want to tell you a tale, if you will, how this is so [that it is a greater evil to do wrong] (cüç; 'toû'to OÜ' tffiÇ; EXEt È8€Àffi Myov À€ç,at) ... Lend an ear, then, as they say, to a very auspicious account (j.laÀa KaÀoû Myou), which you may consider, as l suppose, a child's story (j.lû80v), but l, an accurate account (Myov); for what l am about to tell you l shall regard as really true (cüç; àÀ1l8fl yàp ov'ta)29.
In the beginning of the rule of Zeus, following the older sovereignty of Cronos, the last judgment occurred on the day of one's death, when one was still in possession of body and aH its accouterments and could muster friends as witness for the defense. The judges, however (themselves also embodied and clothed), were confounded by these external trappings, not being able to discern the real condition of the soul from its appearance. Consequently, their judgments were flawed. The guardians of Tartarus and the Blest Isles complained that they were receiving the wrong souls. Zeus, then, charged Prometheus to keep secret the day of death, so that no one would know when judgment would occur; and he appointed his sons Aeacus, Minos, and Rhadamanthys as judges of the dead, who were now stripped of aH bodily paraphernalia. Naked before the judges, and their character clearly revealed, aH souls would receive their just dues. The soul that had committed remediable offenses and thus judged curable would suffer bitter pain in torment, but would, through this punishment, receive the benefit of purgation from iniquity and restoration to life incarnate. The soul of a tyrant, king, or potentate, however, being an evil and incurable soul, would be sent away to everlasting punishment in the infernal dungeon of Tartarus, his fearful sufferings serving as an example to aH wrongdoers. The soul of the philosopher, having lived a holy life in company with justice and truth, would be sent to the Isles of the Blest, there to dweH in eternal happiness apart from aH evil 30 .
After framing the myth, however, Socrates breaks in to reaffirm his commitment to its truth, but also draw from the fictive details basic metaphysical assumptions that will underpin the ethical demands of his foregoing argument-line. This is, Callicles, what l, having heard, believe to be true (a a1C11Koffiç 1ttO"t€Ûül aÀ.llSil etVat); and from these tales, 1 logically infer something such as this (Kat ÈK tOÛtülV trov MyülV to{OVO€ 'tt À-oy{Çollat O"uIlPa{v€tv)31 [Socrates' explicit inferences] : (1) That every person is a composite of soul and body, each having its own nature and end; (2) that the soul, as the measure of the person, is held accountable for its pursuits through life, its activities determining its destiny; and (3) that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and the soul passes into an afterlife to receive its just deserts :
30 Gorgias, 523a3-526d2. Here, the myth is compressed to its essentials; cf. G.K. PLOCHMANN (a) the good soul, having pursued truth, justice, and piety, receives its reward of a preternaturallife of happiness; (b) the bad, but curable soul, having practiced falsehood, injustice, and impiety, undergoes remedial punishment, after which it returns to life incarnate with another chance to become good by practicing virtue; but (c) the incurable soul, having done extreme wrong, suffers eternal punishment and thus becomes an example to others 32 .
Although compressed, these inferred presuppositions are expressly stated in Socrates' account; and these he believes to be true and, so, worthy of belief.
Mter his extrapolation, Socrates adds more eschatological imagery and then ends the tale with a reflection on its power to persuade, admitting his conviction of its truth (D1tO 'tE 'tO'u'tCOV 'twv Mycov 1tÉ1tEtcrlllXt) and professing to pursue the truth ('t~v eXÂ.~8Etav eXcr1cWV 1tEtpacrollat) so to become as good a person as possible. Then, chiding Callicles for his callous disbelief, he offers reasons for his acceptance of the myth.
But then, perhaps, [CalliclesJ you think this is to be taken as an old wife's tale (llû80ç... mcmEp ypa6ç) and you treat it with contempt; it would be in no way surprising to treat it so if in our searching we were to find elsewhere a better and truer account than this (at)'t(Îlv PEÂ.'ttCO Kat eXÂ.Tj8Écr'tEpa). But now you see that you three, who are the wisest of the Greeks, today, you and Polus, and Gorgias, have failed to demonstrate (OUK ËXE'tE eX1toùdsat) that we ought to live any other life than this 33 .
Here, Socrates is ready to bank his trust on the truth of the tale on two counts 34 : (1) it is better and truer than any other accounts known, and (2) it has not been disproved. The reasons are pragmatic and are therefore similar to the practical account that he gives in the Republic (382d, vide supra). And they compare readily with his apology for belief 32 Gorgias, 523a-526c : (l) 524b-d; (2) 524d-e; (3) 524b,d and 526b-c; (3a) 523a-b and 526a-c; (3b) 523b, 524e-525c, 525e, and 526b; (3c) 525c-d and 526b. probabilities provides the rationale of the mantic myth, so this adumbration of true belief serves as the psychological ground on which his persuasion rests 39 . Now briefly, in passing, l offer a slight disclaimer to E.R. Dodds 43 . These two moral perfections, representing the unity of the virtues «<Mr. Outside" and «Mr. Inside»), produce in geometrical proportion 44 order in the soul and so fashion the best life4 5 -a token of the orderly cosmos and the prospect of an orderly state 46 .
Deriving First Principles
To this point, 1 have shown that myth in its pragmatic role projects its mantic function as a truth-bearing fiction and that the extrapolation of its «truths» from the fictive details makes explicit this function, viz., to communicate metaphysical premises in support of practical (moral) claims. 1 shall now argue that these «truths» emerge as «first principles» to serve as the background theory and necessary condition that define the logical limits of particular argument-lines (aU of ethical import) in the 80cratic dialectic. Although evidence for this claim is furnished in the myths and argument-lines of the Gorgias, the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Republic 47 , 1 confine my remarks to the evidence in the Gorgias, using it is a single proof case.
An explanatory model. But, first, turning once more to the Timaeus as our explanatory model, we find a paradigm account of this logical closure. There, Timaeus performs a preliminary maneuver to establish the ground rules for the narration of his likely cosmic story, drawing these distinctions as his regulative principles : . l have omitted this principle since it has no immediate relevancy to the ethical demands of the Gorgias account -unless sorne point can be made for the «moral» space of Tartarus, e.g., the Â.e{~rov of Gorgias, 524a2 (cf. Republic, 614a2 and Phaedrus, 248cl) and the purgatorium of Gorgias, 525b, Phaedo, 113a,d, and Republic, As A.E. Taylor points out, the distinction between being and becoming is equated with the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible 49 ; and this equation entails corresponding equitable distinctions. What is real implies the forms (do,,) as objects of knowledge and models (1tupuody/.lu'tu) of things (1tpaY/.lu'tu)50; what is apparent implies things as objects of opinion and copies (EtKOveç) offorms. And cause, understood as the principle of agency, implies soul (\jfUX~), the spontaneous initiator of aU movement or change -(1) in respect of forms, the cause of mental events, and (2) in respect of things, the cause of physical events -and also the catalytic agent effecting the conjunction of forms and things 51 . These basic assumptions as «first principles», Timaeus c1aims, constitute the conditions and limits of his «likely tale»52 : that whatever is represented in the cosmic myth follows from these assumptions to form a systematic (unified) account. But more than this. We have here, in brief, 1 c1aim, Plato's basic metaphysical background theory (his own «first principles»)53 that frames and supports every argument-line in the dialogues. If the «truths» of the mantic myth entail this theory, they then provide the kind of logical c10sure Timaeus defines in his prefatory remarks and demonstrates in his cosmic account. The mantic myth thus becomes, to turn Socrates' metaphor 54 , the formal «head» of the material argumentline to which it is attached; and its «truths», now «first principles», provide the foundation and logical restraints of its foregoing set of «proofs». A proof case. Reading the Gorgias myth more closely, we can construe Socrates' moral postulates to conform to the pattern of the regulative principles of the cosmic myth and thereby show that they express the same metaphysical formula, only in meta-moral dress. The categorial distinction between appearance and reality is implicit in the contingent separation of body and sou! :
(1) that the soul is the subject of reality, active, eternal, and thus imperishable; (la) that the body is the vehicle of appearance, passive, temporal, and thus perishable; (2) that the virtues (forms) are the principles of reality, the objects of knowledge and models of moral action; (2a) that the vices (phantom-images) are the deceptions of appearance, the objects of false opinion and devices of immoral action; and (3) that the soul (cause) is the agent of reality, the initiator of human action and choice-maker of value judgments : (a) in respect of virtues, the cause of moral action; (b) in respect of vices, the cause of immoral action 55 .
It now remains to show how this set of presuppositions as «first principles» extends regulative control over its preceding argumentline. An abridgement of the lengthy «three act» debate, focusing on two moral issues central to the argument-line, provides sufficient proof of the daim. In the «first act», Socrates engages Gorgias the Sophist in discussion, requesting the definition and power of rhetoric. And Gorgias responds, without defining it, that it is the greatest good for man and an effective teacher and guide. With elenctic acuity, Socrates counters decisively, showing (1) that rhetoric stems from ignorance, not knowledge 56 , and (2) that it is not a teacher of truth and justice, but simply a producer of persuasion for belief5 7 , heedless of truth or falsity, without an account of right and wrong, and with more concern for appearance than reality 58. In «act two», Polus the Sophist takes up the brand in Gorgias' behalf. But, again, in similar fashion, Socrates checks the c1aim, adding that rhetoric is not an art ('tÉXVll), but merely an empiric knack (È/L1tttpta Kat 55 Extrapolated from Gorgias, 523c2-526c5. 56 Gorgias, 455a-456a. N.B., the key citations in the footnotes 56-82 are from the Gorgias and only the sections are given; other citations are given in full. 57 459c-461b. 58 458e-460a.
'tptp~), a branch of flattery (KoÂ.m::da)59 (1) that deals in speculation and pretense 60 , (2) that gives no account of the real nature of things and so does not know their cause 61 , and (3) that aims at the pleasant and ignores the best 62 . The upshot of this censure is that rhetoric is a base and harmful profession, doing wrong by pandering to the lower tastes of the crowd. And, here, 80crates makes his central moral point that doing wrong is worse than suffering it ('tà àOtKeîV KIXKtoV... 'to\> àOtKeîcr8at}63. Against Polus, who alleges the latter, 80crates argues, convincingly, that doing wrong is more painful (Â.U1tllPOU:pov), baser (aïcrxtov), and more ev il (KIXKtOv)64 than suffering it and makes the wrongdoer more wretched (à8Â.tÛHEpaç)65. His reasoning, based on the following grounds, is (1) that knowledge is virtue 66 ; (2) that no one, while caring for the good, will do evi1 67 ; (3) that one pursuing justice will never act unjustly68; and (4) that the good and noble person is happy, but the unjust and base person is wretched 69 . To this moral point, he adds a corollary : that the wrongdoer, who pays the just penalty and is justly punished, suffers what is good 70 . This he argues on the ground that one is benefited from justice (1) by being relieved from the greatest evil and vice of the soul (\jIuxftç 1tOVllPta)71; and (2) being thus relieved, one becomes better in soul (PEÂ.'tteoV 't~v \jIUX~v) and is less wretched, receiving requital from gods and men72. But to do wrong and not pay the penalty is the greatest of aU evits and takes first place (1tav'tffiv llÉyt<HOV 'tE KaL 1tp6hov KaKrov )73.
In the «final act», Callicles the Rhetorician enters the debate, taking issue with 80crates' position on wrongdoing. The argument turns on the moral formula 83 . Without a basis, then, for moral reasoning, theyare unable to comprehend the force of moral argument, and their sallies of stratagems and rhetorical ploys are invariably ad hoc and myopic 84 . Moral argument, as other forms of discourse, is possible only within a frame of reference which furnishes a systematic set of principles that determines the logical limits and adequacy of the premises. This is precisely Socrates' advantage. His background moral the ory is the «saving art» that enables him at every point in the epagogic procedure to argue coherently and forcefully and to sustain his moral claims 85 . Thus, Plato has introduced the mantic myth as a complement to Socrates' art of midwifery. These two dramatic fabrications are inseparable logical maneuvers 86 . Committed to the pursuit of truth and its consequent knowledge, each undertakes the task in its own way. The maieutic art, adopting the technique of indirect inference, sets its sails toward the recovery of knowledge, while the mantic myth, employing the strategy of indirect communication, steers its course toward the disco very of truth. This mythic course, as Plato conceived it, is an effectuaI passage from belief (ntanç) to true opinion (ùôça tXÀ118i]ç) and provides the logical charter for the maieutic craft to make the difficult passage from true opinion to knowledge ( Gorgias, whether offering an epistemic disclaimer, demontrates, nevertheless, a background theory ofregulative moral principles -«saving art» -to which he is commited and which controls the argumentline. The earlier Socrates professes ignorance, disclaiming knowledge of the moral virtues, and relies solely on the argument (elenchus) to out with the requisite moral truth and knowledge. 86 DODDS, op. cit., p. 385 at 527a7, claims that the myth and the preceding argument-line are indepedent of each other.
